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Measuring moral judgement and the implications
of cooperative education and rule-based learning
Abstract
The Defining Issues Test (DIT), developed by Rest (1986), measures a person’s level
of moral development using hypothetical social dilemmas. Although the DIT is useful
for measuring moral development in social settings, it might not adequately capture
an individual’s moral judgement abilities in solving work-related problems (Weber,
1990; Trevino, 1992; Welton et al., 1994). In the present study, the moral judgement
levels of 97 accounting students were measured over a 1 year period using two separate
test instruments, the DIT and a context-specific instrument developed by Welton et al.
(1994). The test scores are significantly higher on the DIT than the Welton instrument
(between the instruments and over time), suggesting that accounting students use
higher levels of moral reasoning in resolving hypothetical social dilemmas and lower
levels of moral reasoning in resolving context-specific dilemmas. The difference in
test scores was highest during cooperative education (work placement programme),
implying that the environment is a significant determinant on students’ test scores.
Key words: Defining Issues Test; Welton instrument; Dilemmas; Cooperative educa-
tion; Rule-based learning
1. Introduction
The Defining Issues Test (DIT) is a self-administered questionnaire, developed
by Rest (1986) that elicits a subject’s level of moral reasoning. The DIT provides a
useful contribution to the understanding of an individual’s moral reasoning abilities
based on dilemmas derived from social issues. However, one limitation of the DIT is
that it might not accurately reflect an individual’s moral reasoning in a professional
setting. The DIT is an accurate measure of moral reasoning in dealing with personal
issues (Fraedrich et al., 1994), but a context-specific instrument might work better in
understanding an individual’s moral reasoning in professional settings (Welton et al.,
1994).
Welton et al. (1994) applied a self-designed test instrument comprising accounting-
specific issues to measure the effect of ethics education on the moral reasoning levels
of graduate accounting students. Test results reveal that students receiving ethics in-
struction demonstrated gains in moral reasoning within the decision context. However,
Welton et al. (1994) did not simultaneously use the DIT and, therefore, were unable
to provide comparative analysis between the scores derived from the DIT and the
Welton instruments. Consequently, whether accounting students resolve context-
specific dilemmas the same way they resolve social dilemmas is still unclear. The
primary aim of the present paper is to address this limitation and to compare ac-
counting students’ moral judgements using two separate test instruments, the DIT,
which contains hypothetical dilemmas on broad life issues, and the context-specific
instrument developed by Welton et al. (1994), which contains realistic dilemmas
particular to business and accounting. The second aim of the present paper is to
explore the potential effects of 1 year of formal accounting education and 1 year of
accounting-related work experience (cooperative education) on the moral develop-
ment of accounting students. A comparative analysis of the test scores between the
DIT and Welton instruments will add evidence to the debate on whether accounting
students reason at their moral capacity in resolving context-specific ethical dilem-
mas, and might explain in part how accountants respond to work-based dilemmas.
Furthermore, the findings in the present paper will determine the extent and imme-
diacy, if any, of situational factors (scenarios in the Welton instrument and students’
cooperative education) on cognitive moral reasoning in ethical decision-making. The
published literature, particularly the popular press, provide numerous examples of
unethical behaviour in the accounting profession. They range from individual tax
fraud to serious breaches of professional and ethical conduct. However, rather than
blame such offences on the ethics of the individual accountant, questionable acts
might be context-specific. The results in the present study might help us to better
understand how people respond to problems in professional settings.
The remainder of the present paper is structured as follows. The next section
describes the theory of moral reasoning and development. The third section
explains the process by which an individual’s moral reasoning and development
is measured. The fourth section further examines the relevant published literature and
establishes the hypotheses. The fifth section displays the results and the final section
discusses the findings followed by the conclusion.
2. Theory of moral reasoning and development
Kohlberg‘s (1969) theory of cognitive moral reasoning and development (CMD)
centres on how one’s belief system dictates conflict resolution and problem solving
in everyday life. Kohlberg’s theory posits that individuals have identifiable cogni-
tive skills that are used to resolve ethical dilemmas. These skills, determined by the
reasons given about why certain actions are perceived as morally just or preferred,
were used by Kohlberg to provide a hierarchical continuum of six stages of cogni-
tive moral development, with each successive stage representing a higher level of
reasoning regarding the definition and nature of right and wrong. The rationale used
by individuals to resolve ethical dilemmas, displays characteristics that enable the
researcher to classify people according to a particular stage of moral development
(Weber, 1990). Much has been written on Kohlberg’s stages of moral development
(see Weber, 1990; Lovell, 1995; Fisher, 1997); it is not the purpose of the present paper
to elaborate upon them unduly. However, some description of Kohlberg’s stages of
moral development is useful to understand the theoretical background and signifi-
cance of the present study.
Kohlberg’s theory consists of three levels and within each level there are two
distinct stages of moral development. The pre-conventional level, which embraces
stages 1 and 2, reflects a level of moral reasoning that is exclusively self-centred. A
person reasoning at these early stages complies with rules and social expectations only
when personal consequences can be avoided (stage 1) and a personal benefit is to be
derived (stage 2). At the conventional level, the focus is on maintaining relationships
and the notion of living within a community assumes increasing significance. At this
level, relationships begin with acting to please one’s peers and superiors (stage 3),
to a course of action defined by compliance to categorical rules such as laws and
regulations (stage 4). The post-conventional, or principled level, reflects a growing
moral autonomy as defined by self-determined, but not selfish moral reasoning. The
focus shifts from strict compliance with formal rules, to embracing notions of a social
contract (stage 5) and universal principles founded on deontological ethical theories
of justice, duties and equal human rights (stage 6). Overall, the individual’s moral
judgement grows less and less dependent on outside influences with each successive
stage of moral reasoning.
Empirical evidence in accounting ethics research has discovered associations be-
tween moral development and independence judgements (Ponemon and Gabhart,
1990); the propensity of an internal auditor to blow the whistle (Arnold and Ponemon,
1991); the ability to detect fraud (Bernardi, 1994); the ability to resist management
pressure (Windsor and Ashkanasy, 1995; Sweeney and Roberts, 1997); and po-
litical ideology (Fisher and Sweeney, 1998). However, comparative analyses have
regularly shown that the test scores for sample groups of accountants and account-
ing students are lower than the scores for other comparative groups, including col-
lege graduates and other professional groups (Gaa, 1994; Ponemon and Gabhart,
1994). Accountants often demonstrate an orientation towards conventional reason-
ing that emphasizes the application of laws and rules. Lampe and Finn (1992)
assert that the internalization of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP)
has instilled a stage 4 reasoning that is predominant in accountants’ moral
reasoning.
3. Measuring cognitive moral development
Although Kohlberg’s primary interest was to devise a theoretical system to repre-
sent the logic of moral thinking, Rest (1986) developed the DIT, a valid, objective,
reliable measurement instrument of CMD based on the six stages of moral develop-
ment, as defined by Kohlberg (1969). The DIT is a self-administered questionnaire
that elicits the subject’s level of moral development. To test moral judgement, sub-
jects are asked to read six hypothetical moral dilemmas and to then select from a
series of ‘issues’ or questions called ‘items for consideration’ that the subject be-
lieves is critical to the resolution of the ethical dilemma. The DIT is based on the
premise that people who are at different points of moral development interpret moral
dilemmas differently, define the critical issues of the dilemma differently, and have
their own intuitions about what is right and fair in a situation. Therefore, differences
in the way dilemmas are recognized and the relative importance given to ‘items
for consideration’, are taken as indications of the subject’s underlying cognitive
capacity.
The DIT asks the individual to rate and rank the importance of ‘items’ that represent
different stages of moral reasoning. The ranking of the four most important issues
enables the researcher to determine a developmental score of CMD known as the
P-score. The P-score reflects the number of times that an item associated with stage
5 or 6 is chosen as an important item in determining a course of action in resolving
a moral dilemma (Rest, 1986). In effect, the P-score represents the probability of
a post-conventional (stages 5 and 6) response to a moral problem. The P-score
is a continuous variable ranging from 0 to 1 and expressed as a percentage of 100.
A distinct advantage of a continuous variable such as the P-score, is the ability to
identify changes in moral reasoning by measuring and comparing differences in test
scores before and after treatment effects. A change in the P-score implies real moral
development.
The Welton instrument, which parallels the DIT in design, comprises four busi-
ness and accounting dilemmas: (i) the ‘Reimbursement’ dilemma considers whether
a finance officer should approve an expense reimbursement claim by his superior,
knowing that the claim has been exaggerated; (ii) the ‘Bankruptcy’ dilemma consid-
ers whether a banker should approve a loan application knowing that the applicants
were former bankrupts; (iii) ‘The Bank Audit’ dilemma considers whether a bank
should increase its loan loss reserve at a time when it could hinder efforts to raise
equity capital through a planned share issue; and (iv) ‘The Opinion’ dilemma con-
siders whether an auditor should issue a qualified opinion because of weaknesses in
the client’s computerized internal control structure implemented by the same audit
firm.1
1 The Welton instrument was selected for the present study because it was the only context-
specific instrument published at the time of data collection for this study.
4. Hypotheses development
4.1. Hypothetical social and context-specific dilemmas
Realistic case dilemmas are more likely to elicit representative reasoning pro-
cesses because they are seen to generate interest and, therefore, involvement by the
respondent (Fredrickson, 1986). ‘Story pull’ occurs when an individual’s familiarity
and experience with a particular dilemma, ‘pulls’ or ‘elicits’ at a particular stage
response (Rest, 1986). The extent of story pull depends upon the subject’s ability
to associate with the character in the dilemma or the nature of the conflict, possibly
because of the occurrence of a similar personal experience (Elm and Weber, 1994).
Weber (1991) argues that remoteness is an important influence on moral reason-
ing. Tolleson et al. (1996) added an element of remoteness to the ‘Heinz and Drug’
dilemma in the original DIT, by changing the key actors from a husband and wife
relationship to strangers. The authors concluded that remoteness had a significant
impact on moral reasoning and behaviour. As strangers, respondents were more de-
tached or less willing to become involved in a dying person’s plight. Similarly, Kenny
and Eining (1996) rely on attribution theory, which posits that individuals behave dif-
ferently when they are actors, as opposed to observers in the ethical dilemma. They
discovered that accounting students apply a different standard of ethical behaviour in
relation to others than they hold for themselves.
The dilemmas contained in the DIT deal in broad life issues, which might not
fairly represent professional environments (Ponemon, 1990, 1993; Weber, 1990;
Trevino, 1992; Elm and Nichols, 1993; Elm and Weber, 1994; Welton et al., 1994).
The dilemmas comprise a wide variety of moral issues ranging from discontinuing a
newspaper for its disturbing social influence to stealing a drug to save the life of one’s
spouse. However, the DIT does not contain dilemmas of a business or professional
nature,2 which might cause subjects to abandon their professional role in favour
of their role as a member of society. For example, Weber (1990) investigated the
moral reasoning abilities of managers using three dilemmas contained in the DIT.
Two of the dilemmas were altered to reflect dilemmas that are typically faced in
a corporate context. Managers subsequently reasoned at lower levels on these two
dilemmas compared with the original and broader unaltered social dilemma. Elm
and Nichols (1993) caution against using the DIT in assessing managers’ moral
reasoning when addressing business-related ethical dilemmas. An alternative test
2 The DIT comprises six dilemmas. (i) Heinz and the Drug: examines whether Heinz should
steal a drug that might save the life of his wife who is dying from cancer; (ii) Student Take-
Over: examines university students’ freedom of speech and their right to protest; (iii) Escaped
Prisoner: examines whether a man should pay for a past crime after living 8 years of a virtuous
existence that contributed to the well-being of the local community; (iv) The Doctor’s Dilemma:
examines the issue of euthanasia; (v) Webster: examines discrimination against minorities; and
(vi) Newspaper: examines freedom of speech as it relates to the press.
instrument containing dilemmas of a business nature provides a more systematic
assessment of how decisions about ethical dilemmas are dealt with at work (Wyld
et al., 1994).
In the field of accounting, Ponemon (1993) argues that the resolution of hypothet-
ical dilemmas of a social nature might be too crude a measure to capture accounting
students’ moral reasoning. Ponemon suggests that an instrument based on accounting
and auditing dilemmas provides a more context-specific measure of moral reasoning.
The solution by some researchers has been to develop a context-specific test instru-
ment containing dilemmas particular to the profession (Welton et al., 1994; Fisher,
1997; Thorne, 2000). Context-specific instruments are based on the DIT and, there-
fore, contain the same psychometric properties. The difference in test instruments,
compared with the DIT, is in the nature of the dilemmas and related ‘items for con-
sideration’. Welton et al. (1994) suggest that accounting-specific dilemmas provide a
better measure of moral reasoning from a professional perspective, because they are
more likely to elicit stage responses that reflect the level of reasoning used in resolv-
ing accounting dilemmas. The primary objective of the present study is to determine
whether accounting students use different levels of moral reasoning in resolving real-
istic professional dilemmas (Welton instrument) compared with hypothetical social
dilemmas (DIT). Welton et al. (1994) and others (see Trevino, 1986; Weber, 1990)
contend that moral judgements on realistic professional dilemmas are not expected to
score as high as moral judgements on hypothetical social situations. In fact, the test
scores on instruments comprising business (Weber, 1990) and accounting (Thorne,
2000, 2001) dilemmas were lower than the test scores based on the DIT. Ponemon
(1990) contends that the DIT is based on conflicts in human life, which are on a higher
plane than client needs. Therefore, test scores elicited by the DIT should at least be
equal or higher than the test scores elicited from a context-specific instrument. The
first hypothesis is stated:
H1: The mean DIT P-score will be significantly higher than the mean Welton P-score
for the accounting students being examined.
4.2. Length of formal education
The second objective of the present paper is to determine whether additional ex-
planatory variables (formal education and cooperative education) have an effect on
students’ test scores. Cognitive development research shows that without significant
intervention, or an appropriate environment, the majority of the adult population will
never surpass the conventional level (stages 3 and 4) of Kohlberg’s model (Kohlberg,
1971). One type of intervention conducive to moral development is formal educa-
tion. Research has repeatedly shown that moral development is highly correlated
with education levels (Blasi, 1980; Rest, 1986, 1988). Increasing DIT P-scores in
post-secondary education suggests that formal education is a major factor transform-
ing moral judgement structures. As the Welton instrument is a measure of moral
development with the same psychometric properties as the DIT, advances in the
moral development of accounting students should be reflected in the test scores in
both the DIT and Welton instruments. The second hypothesis is, therefore, stated:
H2: The DIT and Welton P-scores at the end of the year for the accounting stu-
dents being examined will be significantly higher than the P-scores of the respective
instruments at the beginning of the year.
4.3. Cooperative education
The degree programme from which the students were selected to participate in the
present study is a 4 year programme comprising 2 years of academic study, 1 year
of cooperative education, followed by the final year of academic study. Cooperative
education is an industry placement programme in which students work in industry
and public accounting firms to gain first-hand work experience and apply the theory
learned in the first 2 years of the degree programme. Cooperative education students
are full-time employees and are subject to the same terms and conditions as other
employees of the organization in which they work. The required status of coop-
erative education makes the degree programme unique to the Australian education
environment.
Elm and Nicholls (1993) suggest that the organizational context in which one works
can contribute to moral development and that its influence could be in the direction of
either higher or lower levels of moral reasoning skills, depending on the individual’s
self-monitoring propensity and the actual experiences of the organization. Similarly,
Jones and Hiltebeitel (1995) contend that moral attitudes change as new accountants
assimilate the culture of the profession and their behaviour can be influenced by the
conduct of superiors and accepted industry practices. Therefore, socialization is a
process of adopting the ‘official position’ rather than giving individual judgement
(Bebeau et al., 1985).
The early work of Arlow and Ulrich (1980) noted the potential impact of the
socialization effect on moral judgements. They found that ethics education improves
the ethical awareness of business students, but the effect is not persistent. A follow-up
study 4 years later found that test scores reverted to pre-test levels. Arlow and Ulrich
(1985) suggest that the decline in test scores is accounted for by the socialization
process students undergo as they move into the world of business. Welton et al.
(1994) similarly discovered a positive movement in test scores for a group of students
exposed to ethics instruction, but the effects of ethics intervention were transitory,
with test scores returning to pre-test levels after a 6 month interval (La Grone et al.,
1996). Cooperative education exposes accounting students to a maximum of 1 year of
practical accounting-related work experience. Considering the duration that students
are exposed to the work environment and the temporary status of their employment,
the socialization process is not expected to have a significant effect on test scores
for the sample of accounting students in the present study. Therefore, the following
hypothesis is stated in the null form:
H3: Cooperative education does not have a significant impact on the DIT and Welton
P-scores for the accounting students being examined.
The hypotheses will be analysed by comparing the test scores between the in-
struments and the pre- and post-test scores within each instrument. This analy-
sis has multiple purposes. First, to determine whether accounting students resolve
context-specific dilemmas in the same way they resolve hypothetical social dilemmas
(Hypothesis 1). Second, to determine whether the moral reasoning levels of account-
ing students improve after 1 year of formal accounting education and, if so, whether
their ability to resolve context-specific dilemmas improves to the same extent as their
ability to resolve hypothetical social dilemmas (Hypothesis 2). Finally, to examine
the potential influence of the organizational work environment on students’ moral
reasoning and development (Hypothesis 3).
5. Data collection
The long version of the DIT comprises six dilemmas and, according to Rest
(1986), it can take up to 45 min to complete, whereas the short version comprising
three dilemmas takes up to 35 min to complete. Therefore, the short version is not
necessarily more time efficient. It was discovered during the pilot phase of the present
study that many students required a minimum of 1 h to complete the six-dilemma
version of the DIT. To overcome the problems with administering two test instruments
that could take up to 2 h to complete, the short version (three dilemmas) of the DIT
was combined with the short version (three dilemmas) of the Welton instrument to
form the equivalent of one six-dilemma test, consistent with Rest‘s (1979) original
DIT. Limiting the time required to complete the test instrument will minimize the
number of instruments that will fail the internal consistency checks, because of time
and fatigue.
The short version (three dilemmas) has similar characteristics to the long form (six
dilemmas), but the major drawback is that fewer dilemmas result in less reliability.
However, Rest (1986) has shown that the three dilemmas consisting of Heinz, Prisoner
and Newspaper, have the highest correlation of P-scores, 0.93 of any three-dilemma
set from the full six-dilemma set. The short version of the DIT comprising the
dilemmas as recommended by Rest (1986) is used in the present study. Welton et al.
(1994) developed an accounting-specific test instrument containing four dilemmas.
After careful consideration of all four dilemmas, one dilemma was omitted to make
it consistent with the short (three dilemma) version of the DIT. This dilemma entitled
‘The Opinion’ was omitted, because the critical issues in this dilemma rely on an
understanding of auditing concepts that might be unfamiliar to entry-level accounting
students.
Students from all year levels of the degree programme were invited to partici-
pate in the present study (see Table 1 for an outline of the sample description). The
Table 1
Sample description, including the spread over the 4 years of the degree programme
Year
Description 1 2 3 4 All students
Sample size 18 20 12 47 97
Female 8 7 8 32 55
Male 10 13 4 15 42
Mean age 19.01 21.35 20.01 22.25 21.04
sample comprises 97 full-time volunteer accounting students ranging in age from
18 to 22 years (mean 21.04 years) with adequate gender representation (55 women
and 42 men). The resulting questionnaires were organized into four groups based on
the students’ year of enrolment with each group comprising students from different
year levels. The number of students enrolled in each group is: year 1, 18; year 2,
20; year 3, 12; year 4, 47. Students completed the test instrument three times through-
out a 1 year period; the beginning of the year (pre-test), the middle of the year
(mid-test) and at the end of the year (post-test). During this process, students were
asked to mark the test instrument with a self-determined identifier so that the test
instruments could be matched for the purpose of paired sample testing. According
to Rest (1979), the effects of dilemma familiarity from re-testing the same sub-
jects with the same dilemmas are negligible. Test–retest studies with an interval
of 1–3 weeks, show that the effect on mean P-scores is insignificant (Davison and
Robbins, 1978). However, changes in P-scores, if any, beyond the 3 week period are
related to the time between the tests and presumably ‘real moral development’, rather
than simply retaking the test. Therefore, Rest (1986) recommends using the same
dilemmas.
The DIT contains reliability and consistency checks that prevent subjects from
artificially inflating their test scores. A completed instrument that fails either of these
checks is rendered unusable and withdrawn from the sample. The Welton instrument
is based on the same psychometric properties as the DIT and, therefore, contains
the same reliability and consistency checks that apply to the DIT. Completing the
DIT and Welton instruments three times throughout the year (3 tests × 97 students)
resulted in 291 Welton instruments and 291 DITs. The loss rate (test instruments
invalidated because of the reliability and consistency checks: 39 DIT and 16 Welton)
combined with the attrition rate (did not complete: 36 DIT and 36 Welton), resulted
in a total of 239 usable Welton instruments and 216 usable DITs (see Table 2). The
usable DIT and Welton instruments were then matched using the identifying mark
inscribed by the students. The matching process resulted in a further 8 DITs and
21 Welton instruments being removed from the sample because they could not be
matched with a corresponding test instrument. This process resulted in a total of 208
paired samples.
Table 2
Usable matched test instruments
DIT Welton
Sample size (97 × 3) 291 291
Loss rate (failed reliability and consistency checks) 39 16
Attrition (did not complete) 36 36
Usable 216 239
Matched using student inscribed identifier 208 208
DIT, Defining Issues Test.
Table 3
Paired sample comparisons within and between the 208 usable matched test instruments
Mean DIT Mean Welton
Group n P-score (SD) P-score (SD) Difference t p
All students 208 34.14 (18.97) 30.77 (15.01) 3.37 2.40 0.01∗
Pre-test 77 30.84 (17.01) 30.30 (14.43) 0.18 0.23 0.41
Mid-test 70 35.33 (19.00) 31.54 (15.17) 3.79 1.59 0.06
Post-test 60 36.93 (20.89) 30.49 (15.75) 6.44 2.52 0.01∗
Post-test–pre-test +6.09 1.88 0.03∗
Post-test–pre-test +0.19 0.07 0.47
∗Significant at 0.05 (one-tailed). DIT, Defining Issues Test; SD, standard deviation.
6. Findings
The mean DIT P-score for the entire sample of accounting students in the present
study (208 matched pairs) is 3.37 percentage points higher than the mean Wel-
ton P-score (see Table 3). The repeated sample t-test reveals that the difference in
P-scores is statistically significant, t(207) = 2.40, p ≤ 0.05, one-tailed, suggesting that
accounting students score higher on the DIT than the Welton instrument. Further-
more, the Pearson correlation indicates that the relation between the DIT and Welton
P-scores is weak, r = 0.31, n = 208, p> 0.01. Two interpretations might result from
this finding. First, the Welton instrument is not an accurate measure of moral reason-
ing compared to the DIT, or second, subjects use different levels of moral reasoning
in analysing accounting-specific dilemmas compared with hypothetical social dilem-
mas. The authors of the Welton instrument report a Cronbach alpha of 0.62 suggesting
high internal validity particularly when it is compared with similar studies that re-
port lower Cronbach alphas. Additionally, Mary Beth Armstrong, a noted researcher
in the field of moral cognitive development research, independently validated the
wording of the instrument and the scoring scheme (Welton et al., 1994). Assuming
that the Welton instrument is an accurate measure of moral reasoning in a profes-
sional context, the findings in the present study support the first hypothesis and it is
Table 4
Paired sample comparisons based on year levels of the 208 usable matched test instruments
Group n Mean DIT P-score (SD) Mean Welton P-score (SD) Difference t p
Year 1 38 29.38 (16.03) 29.29 (15.42) 0.09 0.02 0.49
Year 2 44 35.90 (21.22) 30.07 (14.04) 5.83 1.88 0.03∗
Year 3 29 38.50 (16.96) 24.02 (12.09) 14.48 14.26 0.0001∗
Year 4 97 33.90 (19.38) 33.69 (15.49) 0.21 0.10 0.45
∗Significant at 0.05 (one-tailed). DIT, Defining Issues Test; SD, standard deviation.
concluded that accounting students appear to apply different ethical considerations in
resolving context-specific dilemmas (such as the dilemmas contained in the Welton
instrument) and hypothetical social dilemmas (such as the dilemmas contained in the
DIT).
The second hypothesis is analysed by comparing the pre- and post-test scores for
the DIT and Welton instruments. The means, standard deviations and t-statistics are
reported in Table 3. The DIT P-scores increase progressively throughout the year
with a significant increase in post-test scores (post-test–pre-test: 6.09 percentage
points), t(136) = 1.88, p< 0.05, one-tailed. However, the Welton P-scores remain
static throughout the year and the difference in the pre- and post-test scores (0.19
percentage points) is not significant, t(136) = 0.07, p> 0.05, one-tailed. This finding
is contrary to that of Welton et al. (1994) who find a positive movement in test
scores. The increasing difference between the DIT and Welton P-scores, which is
statistically significant at the end of the year (post-test), occurs because the DIT
P-score increases with time but the Welton P-score does not. The findings in the
present study suggest that students are capable of improving their moral capacity
as measured by the DIT P-score but do not demonstrate the same improvement in
the Welton P-scores. Therefore, the second hypothesis is partially rejected and it is
concluded that only the DIT P-scores increase after 1 year of accounting education
but not the Welton P-scores.
The third hypothesis is tested by clustering the test instruments into four groups
based on the students’ year of enrolment. The purpose of this analysis is to determine
if the P-scores of any one group, particularly those undertaking cooperative education,
displayed a significant difference between the test instruments. The means, standard
deviations and the results of the repeated sample t-tests for each group are presented
in Table 4. The mean DIT P-scores recorded in the present study are higher than the
Welton P-scores in all four groups, but the size of the difference is greatest during
the second and third years of the degree programme. A comparison of the P-scores
between the groups reveal that the difference in P-scores is not significant for years 1
and 4; however, the difference in P-scores is significant in years 2 and 3. It appears that
there was a significant change in the P-scores of the period during which accounting
students were either preparing for or undertaking cooperative education, with the
largest difference occurring during the actual work placement period.
7. Cooperative education and rule-based learning
The increase in DIT P-scores after 1 year of accounting education is encouraging
and consistent with empirical research, which suggests that P-scores increase with
years in formal education. However, the Welton P-scores remained static throughout
the year and do not compare favourably with the DIT P-scores. This finding is con-
sistent with other studies, which suggest that accountants and managers use lower
levels of moral reasoning in the resolution of context-specific dilemmas and higher
levels of moral reasoning in the resolution of context-free dilemmas (Weber, 1990;
Thorne, 2000, 2001). In accounting, studies using the DIT as the measure of analysis
typically report that accountants and accounting students do not develop moral rea-
soning capacities commensurate with individuals having similar social, economic or
educational backgrounds (Gaa, 1995). In other words, accounting professionals lag
behind their counterparts in other disciplines (Puxty et al., 1994). If accountants lag
behind their counterparts based on DIT evidence, the results in the present study
have greater significance because the gap in test scores might be larger using a
context-specific instrument. The question now facing accounting researchers is why
accountants exhibit lower scores on the context-specific instrument than the DIT
when the construct is arguably the same. The present paper does not attempt to deter-
mine causal links between accounting education and the test scores, but it explores
possible reasons for the findings.
7.1. Cooperative education
It was reported above that the Welton P-scores are significantly lower during the
middle stages of the degree programme, particularly cooperative education (year 3)
where the difference is largest. According to Thorne (2001), cooperative education
students do not appear to resolve ethical dilemmas at their cognitive moral capacity.
Thorne (2000, 2001) suggests that cooperative education students, like accountants,
respond to social factors when formulating an ethical judgement and respond to
self-interest in the exercise of professional judgement. Reall et al. (1998) provide an
interesting analysis upon which to elucidate the effect of the work environment on
P-scores. In the spirit of a competitive game situation, students took off their ‘moral
reasoning caps’ and put on their ‘game faces’. Their game faces involved exhibiting
moral reasoning levels that were well below their capability based on their DIT
P-scores. Students used game rules to define appropriate boundaries of acceptable
conduct and in effect used lower levels of moral reasoning than their moral capability
when taking part in the spirit of a competitive game. In the present study, the students’
DIT P-scores, a measure of their moral capacity, are significantly higher than their
Welton P-scores; therefore, it might be inferred that accounting students do not always
resolve moral dilemmas using their most principled reasoning. It appears that short-
term contextual factors, like the work environment, might adversely affect Welton
P-scores.
Ponemon (1990) suggests that the self-selection or selection-socialization process
within the public accounting profession might be the cause of a net decrease in
measured moral cognition with increasing levels of seniority in the firm hierarchy.
Selection-socialization occurs when senior management promote like-minded em-
ployees and, in turn, employee accountants unwittingly adopt the ‘culture’ of the
firm in the hope of furthering their careers within the referent culture. Eventually,
employee attitudes change and resemble the culture of the profession as they progress
to senior ranks. In a study of auditors’ decision processes, Lampe and Finn (1992)
find that the socialization process appears to be present in the first 2 years of public
accounting experience. With rapid turnover in the first 2 years of employment, entry-
level auditors self-select and employers counsel out auditors with too high, or too
low, a level of moral development. The socialization effect is not new, but where it
was assumed to occur with time, the cooperative education students in the present
study suggest that the socialization effect is immediate: within 1 year.
The accounting students in the present study who reason at the conventional
level are more likely to accept the norms of the referent culture and maximize their
opportunities for career advancement. This is particularly so in large accounting
firms which have strong socialization processes that are designed to recruit, reshape
and retain graduate accountants that fit into a hierarchical team-orientated structure
that promotes conformity (Wilkinson et al., 2003). Therefore, lower Welton P-scores
might be the result of an organizational culture that typifies reasoning at stages lower
than the student’s own stage of development. The socialization process combined
with a desire for success (to obtain full-time career positions with the student’s
respective employers at the completion of the degree programme) might unwittingly
lead students to abandon their personal values (Ludwig and Longenecker, 1993)
as measured by the DIT, for a successful career. In general, it appears accounting
students will operate at different levels of moral reasoning in different contextual
environments. An accounting student might be capable of exercising considerable
ethical maturity in the freethinking university environment, but may learn not to do
so in a context-specific environment.
7.2. Potential effects of rule-based learning
A growing body of research suggests that accounting education might actually in-
hibit student’s progression to higher levels of moral reasoning and ethical awareness
because of the emphasis on rule-based thinking (McPhail, 1999, 2001). Rule-based
thinking is the inadvertent adoption of principles or rules established by another
(Kidder, 1995). An increasing emphasis in accounting education on technical com-
petence or rule-based learning and less concern with the broader questions of hu-
man values and morality has resulted in students being trained rather than educated
(Blundell and Booth, 1988; McNeel, 1994). Accounting courses are technical and
rule-based, they focus on professional examinations, they do not to deal with ‘val-
ues, ethics and integrity’, and they fail to develop students’ critical thinking skills
(Albrecht and Sack, 2000). The implication for accounting students is that they
overlook ethical issues because they focus too much on technical issues (Bebeau
et al., 1985). Teaching standards and regulations throughout the degree programme
arguably lead students to concentrate on rules and technical correctness without
discursive analysis, limiting their understanding of the issues involved. Teaching
that emphasizes conformance to regulations rather than the underlying ethical issues
could promote a rigid understanding of professional responsibilities that is devoid of
professional judgement. Consequently, students are trained in ‘hard and fast rules’ at
the expense of critical thinking abilities resulting from an overemphasis on technical
matters (Welton et al., 1994; Lampe, 1996).
This rule-based approach to accounting education and practice reflecting the in-
ternalization of GAAP might have inadvertently instilled a stage 4 (conformance to
laws) orientation in the students’ moral reasoning abilities. Rest’s (1986) P-score is a
measure of the extent to which a subject consistently gives high importance to stage
5 and stage 6 ‘items’. Therefore, advances in moral development up to and including
stage 4 orientations will not elevate students’ P-scores even if moral development has
occurred. Only when accounting students are taught to acquire stage 5 and 6 moral
reasoning abilities will subjects improve their test scores. Arguably, rule-based learn-
ing has become so ingrained in the accounting students’ mindset that they might be
stuck at stage 4 and unable to develop to higher stages of moral reasoning. Therefore,
the lower Welton P-scores in years 2 and 3 of the degree programme have been in-
fluenced by accounting education or a work environment that emphasizes rule-based
thinking.
The DIT P-scores were significantly higher than the Welton P-scores in years 2
and 3 of the degree programme, but were not dissimilar in years 1 and 4. Yet, rule-
based learning exists in all stages of the degree programme. The pre-test scores for
entry-level students (year 1) in the present study indicate that there is no difference
in the way students resolve social and accounting or business-related dilemmas (see
Table 3). The first indication of a difference in the DIT and Welton P-scores appear
in the second year of the degree programme. It appears that the internalization of
rule-based learning requires at least 1 year of post-secondary education before its
effects are reflected in test scores. Alternatively, limited exposure (up to 1 year) to
rule-based learning, does not affect post-test scores. Further cognitive development
research could explore the longitudinal effects of accounting education on students’
moral development.
If the potential effect of cooperative education on P-scores is set aside, the increas-
ing difference in test scores between year 2 and year 3 might be indicative of the
continuing effects of rule-based learning. However, in year 4, the difference in DIT
and Welton P-scores is not statistically different, in spite of the rule-based learning
that continues in this stage of the degree programme. The intervention that might
counter the continuing effects of rule-based learning is the inclusion of a dedicated
and required course in ethics in the final year of the degree programme undertaken
by the students being examined. The ethics course is deliberately designed to counter
the criticisms of rule-based learning and sensitize students to ethics in accounting
and conflict resolution methods. The similarity in test scores between the DIT and the
Welton instrument in year 4, and the decline in the growing gap experienced in the
earlier years of the programme, might be the result of the direct curricula approach to
ethics education. After studying a discrete course in ethics, students are sensitized to
ethics in accounting and are more aware of the ethical issues in the dilemmas posed
in the Welton instrument and their professional and ethical responsibilities. Future
research should investigate the effects of ethics education on accounting programmes
and in particular, a discrete ethics course in accounting.
8. Conclusion
The evidence in the present study suggests that context-specific dilemmas, through
story pull, familiarity, cooperative education and rule-based learning, exert sufficient
influence that prevents students from demonstrating their moral maturity as measured
by the DIT. The significant increase is post-test DIT P-scores indicates that account-
ing students can progress to higher levels of moral reasoning but remain capable of
expressing moral decision-making rationale at lower stages as well. Therefore, ac-
counting students who have developed the ability to reason at the post-conventional
stage might not always advocate a solution consistent with that stage.
If one goal of accounting education is to develop in students an awareness of
the role and impact of accounting on third parties and society in general, then the
findings in the present study have important implications for the way accounting is
taught. The technical focus of accounting education using rule-based learning should
be de-emphasized and replaced with an appreciation of the role of accounting in
the political, economic and social contexts. The direct curricula approach to ethics
education might be one way to achieve this goal. The findings in the present study
have implications for the accounting profession as well as accounting education. A
professional accountant is relied upon and trusted by the general public in respect
of their accounting affairs. In return for this trust, accountants have a fundamental
duty of care to protect the interest of their client, employer and the public. However,
the findings suggest that accountants become baffled when ideals conflict and are
likely to resort to lower stages of moral reasoning for resolving conflict. For users of
accounting information, this means that accountants might overlook their third party
obligations in favour of self-interest. The strength of the socialization process and the
potential influence of accounting firm cultures that emphasize revenue and short-term
earnings (Wyatt, 2004) means that we must now question whether the value systems
of accounting professionals are strong enough to withstand client and economic
pressures, which could compromise ethical judgement (Douglas et al., 1995).
The results of the present study should be limited to interpretations of students’
moral reasoning, not their moral actions. The test instruments ask the subject what
a person ought to do in a particular hypothetical situation, but not what the subject
actually would do, or did do, in a particular situation. Therefore, differences in test
scores do not imply significant differences in behavioural intent (Robin et al., 1996).
Similarly, interpreting the findings of the present study should be restricted to ac-
counting education and any reference on how the findings relate to practising ac-
countants is speculative and should be viewed with caution (Fisher and Ott, 1996).
Finally, the sample of accounting students in the present study consists entirely of
volunteers, which lends itself to a self-selection bias. The subjects were selected
by design from a single university and, combined with a small sample size, the
sample might not be representative of the general population of accounting students.
Future researchers should expand the research design beyond their own students and
include several schools with similar and different educational philosophies to assist
in the generalizability of the results.
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